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Note
Incentivizing Access to the WTO’s Dispute
System for the Least-Developed Countries: Legal
Flaws in Brazil’s Upland Cotton Decision
Luke Olson
Agriculture is one of the few areas where developing
countries have an advantage over developed countries due to
their ability to create the same product at significantly lower
1
prices.
Many developed countries, however, provide
agricultural subsidies to their farmers in order to improve their
export market and protect farmers against the volatility of crop
2
prices, weather fluctuations and other factors. In an exportheavy country like the United States, these subsidies often
have an adverse effect on international markets by essentially
3
creating a price guarantee for farmers. When the government
subsidizes their losses, farmers often produce despite the
decreasing demand, where they would otherwise restrict
4
production. Such overproduction floods global markets with
the subsidized crop drives down food prices and negatively
affects unsubsidized farmers who have to compete with the
5
subsidized farmers.
Since developing countries are unable to compete on price
of the crops with developed countries, they are forced to import
 JD candidate, 2014, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Doha Round Negotiations on Agricultural
Subsidies, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 335, 343 (2007–2008) (comparing
Western and Central African countries to the U.S. in terms of cost of cotton
production).
2. See generally Matthew C. Porterfield, U.S. Farm Subsidies and the
Expiration of the WTO’s Peace Clause, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 999 (2006).
3. See Elizabeth Bullington, Comment, WTO Agreements Mandate That
Congress Repeal the Farm Bill of 2002 and Enact an Agriculture Law
Embodying Free Market Principles, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1211, 1213–16
(2005) (discussing the negative effects U.S. cotton subsidies have in other
parts of the world).
4. Id. at 1215 (explaining the connection between U.S. subsidies and
U.S. farmers’ overproduction).
5. Id.

101
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those crops rather than grow them on their own, nullifying a
6
potential trade advantage. Furthermore, because agriculture
plays such a significant role in alleviating poverty in developing
7
countries , these subsidies are not only an economic issue, but a
humanitarian one.
In response to this dilemma, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) has attempted to reduce agricultural subsidies and
introduce free market principles into the global market in order
8
to increase global competitiveness. The U.S., however, has
9
resisted these changes. In 2003, Brazil initiated a suit against
the U.S., claiming that U.S. cotton subsidies had substantially
10
prejudiced Brazil’s cotton industry. The WTO panel ruled
largely in Brazil’s favor and allowed it to enact retaliatory
trade measures against the U.S. until the U.S. aligns its
11
domestic policy with WTO requirements.
While trade
sanctions have had some success in the case of Brazil’s cotton
industry, it does not provide the same protections to the
12
majority of developing countries. Most developing countries do
6. See generally Kennedy, supra note 1, at 336–38 (laying out the largest
exporters of cotton, with the U.S. being the biggest exporter globally). For
example, in the least-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, outside Cape
Verde and Lesotho, agriculture employs a minimum of 50% of the total labor
force. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 2004, The Least
Developed Countries Report 2004: Linking International Trade with Poverty
Reduction, 349, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004 (May 27, 2004).
7. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE LEAST
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES REPORT 2004: LINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH
POVERTY REDUCTION, at 349, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/LDC/2004, U.N. Sales No.
E.04.II.D.27 (2004).
8. INFO. AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS DIV., WORLD TRADE ORG.,
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 26–29 (5th ed. 2011) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
THE WTO] (providing an overview of the WTO’s mission as it pertains to
agriculture).
9. See KEVIN WATKINS, OXFAM, CULTIVATING POVERTY: THE IMPACT OF
U.S. COTTON SUBSIDIES ON AFRICA at 1 (2002) (“I told the people, I said if you
give me a chance to be the President, we’re not going to treat our agricultural
industry as a secondary citizen when it comes to opening up markets. And I
mean that . . . . The farm bill is important legislation . . . . It will promote
farmer independence, and preserve the farm way of life. It helps America’s
farmers, and therefore it helps America.” (quoting George W. Bush, President,
Remarks by the President on Signing the Farm Bill (May 13, 2002)).
10. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1219 (noting the complaint brought to the
WTO by Brazil claiming that U.S. cotton subsidies violated the Agreement on
Agriculture).
11. See generally Porterfield, supra note 2, at 1034 (describing Brazil’s
threats against U.S. intellectual property and services).
12. See Bullington, supra note 3, at 1219 (stating that the WTO ruled, in
large part, on behalf of Brazil).
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not have a trade sector advanced enough to enact effective
13
trade sanctions against the U.S. Therefore, while WTO
remedies have improved substantially, they do not provide a
14
viable remedy for the majority of developing countries.
This note seeks to understand the shortcomings of the
current WTO dispute system and provide recommendations for
its potential improvement. Part I briefly outlines the history of
agricultural subsidies, their effect on developing countries, and
the WTO’s attempt to remedy trade imbalances. Part II
analyzes the current WTO dispute system and identifies
several shortcomings in the system while advocating for
modifications in the dispute system and its remedies. This part
also analyzes the panel’s recent decision in Brazil’s cotton
subsidies challenge. This Note concludes that while the WTO
has substantially improved enforcement of its regulations, this
improvement insufficiently protects the majority of developing
countries. Adequate protection requires further modification of
available remedies.
I. EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES ON
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS AND THE RESPONSE BY THE
WTO
A. HISTORY OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
The U.S. has a long history of subsidizing its farmers’ crops
15
to provide risk insurance for domestic farmers. In reaction to
falling grain prices after World War I, three legislative bills
granted price subsidies to domestic farmers: the 1922 Grain
Futures Act, the 1929 Agricultural Marketing Act and the 1933
16
Agricultural Adjustment Act. In these acts, the government
13. See generally Ousmane Badiane et al., Cotton Sector Strategies in West
and Central Africa (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/173,
2002) (“The competitiveness of the region’s cotton sector is evidenced by the
low level of costs when compared to other countries and the strong growth in
production over the last two decades.”).
14. See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 346 (describing how sub-Sahara African
cotton farmers are continually disadvantaged by U.S. agricultural policy).
15. Porterfield, supra note 2, at 1002–05 (discussing the expiration of the
WTO’s peace clause that protected countries against challenges to domestic
subsidy policy).
16. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities
Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 312–28 (1997) (discussing the history of
the Grain Futures Act, Agricultural Marketing Act and Agricultural

OLSON Article

104

2/25/2014 10:13 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol 23:1

controlled commodity prices and agricultural supply by paying
farmers to leave land unused during times of low commodity
17
prices. Over time, the U.S. expanded methods of agricultural
subsidies to include export subsidies, price supports to different
crops, increased crop insurance, increases in guaranteed
federal loans and replacement of some price supports with fixed
18
payments.
In the 1990s, the U.S. substantially changed its approach
to agricultural subsidies in response to growing pressure from
19
the international community. In 1994, Congress ratified the
Uruguay Round of negotiations, which created the World Trade
Organization and placed significant restrictions on domestic
20
subsidies. In 1996, Congress passed the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act, which revised and simplified
direct payment programs for crops and eliminated milk price
supports through government purchases in an effort to keep
21
subsidies aligned with WTO restrictions.
However, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act in
2002 superseded many of these provisions and instituted three
programs of subsidies for domestic farmers: (1) marketing loan
program payments; (2) direct payments; and (3) counter22
cyclical payments. The government provides marketing loan
subsidies to farmers based on the value of the specific
commodity during times when market prices are at harvesttime lows. This allows the producer to delay the sale of the
23
commodity until more favorable market conditions emerge.
Direct payment subsidies are a fixed payment offered to
qualifying farmers without regard to the economic need of the

Adjustment Act).
17. Porterfield, supra note 2, at 1002.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; see generally WTO Secretariat, Info. & Media Relations Div., WTO
Agriculture Negotiations – The Issues, and where we are now (Dec. 1, 2004),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd00_
contents_e.htm (giving a general overview of agricultural issues discussed in
the WTO between 2000 and 2004) ).
21. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, H.R. 2646, 107th
Cong., (2002) (providing overview of non-recourse loan program under the
1996 and 2002 Farm Bills).
22. Porterfield, supra note 15, at 1004.
23. JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21604, MARKETING LOANS,
LOAN DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS, AND COMMODITY CERTIFICATES, 2–3 (2004)
(explaining the market loan program).
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24

recipient. Because the payments are fixed, direct payment
subsidies are only indirectly related to the global market for
25
crops. Lastly, counter-cyclical subsidies provide additional
assistance on top of direct payment subsidies during periods of
26
low demand or price lows. In these instances, a farmer
receives a counter-cyclical subsidy in addition to a direct
27
payment subsidy in order to counteract low crop prices.
Counter-cyclical subsidies significantly rely on the market and,
28
therefore, can fluctuate considerably.
B. EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET
Government payments to U.S. farmers are intended to
provide protection from unsustainable losses due to decreased
29
demand or prices.
However, subsidies that encourage
production without a market for that production tend to cause
30
overproduction. As a result, this surplus floods the domestic
and
international
market
where
the
demand
is
disproportionate to the supply, causing a drop in prices. This
adversely affects farmers in developing countries who produce
31
that commodity. Ironically, such a drop in prices then causes a
32
further need to subsidize domestic farmers. This creates a
cycle in which subsidized farmers overproduce in the face of a
market in which they would otherwise restrict production,
33
thereby driving down crop prices.
These price drops,
24. Bullington, supra note 3, 1219–20 (claiming that the 2002 Farm Bill
violated the United States’s obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture
in the WTO and suggesting that Congress repeal the Act and pass legislation
that reduces agricultural subsidies to within WTO regulations).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1220–22.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1220.
30. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 8, at 26 (explaining the
effect that trade-distorting policies have on international trade and the
obstruction they cause in creating an international free market).
31. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) (remarking that increased government subsidies provide incentives
to overproduce and will cause prices to eventually drop due to an oversupply,
forcing farmers to continue to produce at unsustainable rates); see also
Bullington, supra note 3, at 1215.
32. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1242–43 (explaining how domestic
subsidies hurt small domestic farms).
33. Id. at 1241–43 (explaining that subsidies benefit larger domestic
farms that receive the most subsidies).
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consequently, lead to additional subsidies.
Farmers in developed countries can generally weather
these price drops, because the government subsidizes a portion
of their production costs. However, farmers in developing
34
countries struggle to compete without the buoy of subsidies.
Unable to compete with subsidized farmers in developed
countries, many farmers in developing countries are forced out
35
of business. This causes two adverse effects: (1) since the
agricultural sector in developing countries accounts for a larger
36
part of national gross domestic product , it causes a severe
37
adverse effect on developing countries’ economies ; and (2) the
lack of domestic production of crops in developing countries
necessitates the importation of crops from developed countries.
This exacerbates the economic dependency of developing
38
countries on developed countries.
Without subsidies, agriculture represents one of the few
areas in which developing countries have an advantage over
developed countries. In agriculture, developing countries
produce essentially the same product at significantly lower
39
prices. For example, cotton production in the U.S. costs
40
41
roughly $0.73/lb, whereas in Burkina Faso it costs $0.21/lb.
However, when the U.S. subsidizes cotton farmers and drives
down the international market price, farmers in Burkina Faso

34. Id.
35. Id. (explaining the adverse effects of U.S. farming subsidies on
developing nations’ economies).
36. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 335–36 (“With the exceptions of Cape Verde
and Lesotho, agriculture employs at a minimum more than 50% of the total
labor force in all [sub-Saharan African least-developed countries].”).
37. Scott D. Andersen & Meredith A. Taylor, Brazil’s WTO Challenge to
U.S. Cotton Subsidies: The Road to Effective Disciplines of Agricultural
Subsidies, Bus. L. Brief 2, 4–5 (2009–2010) (discussing the $2.9 billion in price
suppression that U.S. cotton subsidies created on an annual basis in the
international cotton market.)
38. See generally Kennedy, supra note 1 (illustrating how agricultural
subsidies not only protect domestic farmers, but increase developing countries’
reliance on U.S. exports by using cotton as an example; explaining that the
U.S., China and India combined produce 50% of the world’s cotton and the
U.S. exports 70% of its cotton).
39. See generally Badiane et al., supra note 13 (“The competitiveness of
the region’s cotton sector is evidenced by the low level of costs when compared
to other countries and the strong growth in production over the last two
decades.”).
40. All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars, unless indicated otherwise.
41. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 343; see also WATKINS, supra note 9.
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42

cannot compete with farmers in the U.S. A cotton farmer in
Burkina Faso must then either choose to produce more or find
43
a more profitable enterprise. Agricultural subsidies, therefore,
create an imbalanced trade system that prejudicially affects
44
developing countries.
C. AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES HAVE RECEIVED SIGNIFICANT
CRITICISM FROM BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
Agricultural subsidies have received considerable domestic
and international criticism for their prejudicial effect on
international crop prices and their consequent impact on the
45
agricultural sector of developing countries. Some members of
Congress vehemently opposed a proposal to move away from
agricultural subsidies and slowly towards a more paradigmatic
46
free market system. U.S. criticism centers on the negative
effects the subsidies will have on the U.S. economy, the
unsustainability of subsidized farming, and on the political
47
ramifications on trade relationships. In the legislative history
of the 2002 Farm Bill, Senator Bunning expressed his concerns:
On the one hand, [this bill] raises price supports
quickly and holds out the possibility of putting a few
more dollars in their pocket in [the] short run. But, on
the other hand, I believe all of these extra production
42. Jay Fabiosa et al., The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization
and Agricultural Markets Liberalization: Impacts on Developing Economies, 27
REV. AGRIC. ECON. 317, 318 (2005) (citation omitted) (“Exports from some of
these countries are subsidized explicitly or implicitly through production
subsidies and are often “dumped” on world markets. The objective of income
transfer to domestic farmers is not in question, but rather, the way it is
accomplished with coupled and untargeted policies. These transfers frustrate
competitive exporters in developing economies and compromise income
generation in poor countries, such as in the case of cotton”).
43. See Bullington, supra note 3, at 1242 n.123 (citing Trade: Sour
Subsidies, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 2004) (referring to the exportation of illegal
narcotics by developing countries).
44. Kennedy, supra note 1 passim.
45. See 148 CONG. REC. S4029 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Bunning) (expressing concern over the domestic overproduction of crops as a
result of U.S. farm subsidies); see also Kennedy, supra note 1, at 339–340
(explaining how ninety developing countries insisted that the issues
surrounding cotton subsidies be addressed).
46. Id. (statement of Sen. Bunning) (“I want a farm bill I can support.”).
47. Id.
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incentives will lead to so much overproduction of crops
that it will eventually drive commodity prices through
the floor and cause an income disaster in the long
48
run.
Senator Corzine also stated:
These subsidies naturally lead to overproduction
which distorts the market, unfairly benefits a limited
number of the largest producers and imposes
excessive costs on all consumers . . . I am also very
concerned that the legislation’s large increase in
commodity subsidies would undermine U.S. trade
49
policy . . . .
Despite this opposition, the U.S. has continued its domestic
policy of using agricultural subsidies to combat price lows and
50
demand drop-offs.
The international community has also criticized U.S.
agricultural subsidies on the basis that subsidies negatively
51
affect the economies of developing countries. Mark Malloch
Brown, the former head of the United Nations Development
Program, stated, “It is the extraordinary distortion of global
trade, where the West spends $360 billion a year on protecting
its agriculture with a network of subsidies and tariffs that costs
48. Id.; see also id. (statement of Sen. McConnell) (“In fact, the commodity
title essentially tells the farmer that the market doesn’t matter anymore. The
target prices now become the producer’s price guarantee. This policy will
encourage over-production which, in turn, will lead to lower prices. This, of
course, favors larger farms, because the more you produce the more Federal
payments you receive. The more money you have will also enable you to
purchase more land to produce even more.”).
49. Id. at S4036 (statement of Sen. Corzine) ( “I also am very concerned
that the legislation’s large increase in commodity subsidies would undermine
U.S. trade policy and make it much harder to win concession in international
trade negotiations. That’s because huge U.S. subsidies would drive down
global crop prices, and adversely affect the economies of many other countries,
especially developing nations. These nations then would be much less likely to
open their markets to American companies. The end result would be that
generous subsidies to a small handful of agribusinesses would end up
undermining a much broader range of U.S. manufacturers and service
providers, and would cost American jobs.”).
50. Watkins, supra note 9, at 12 (explaining that farmers will receive $.52
for every pound of cotton under new arrangements).
51. Badiane et al., supra note 13, at 1 (claiming that cotton subsidies
adversely affect developing nations’ attempts to alleviate poverty).
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developing countries about $50 billion in potential lost
52
agricultural exports.” The WTO has consistently criticized
domestic support in trade-related matters. It reaffirmed its
disapproval during the Doha round of negotiations in 2001,
stating: “Building on the work carried out to date and without
prejudging the outcome of the negotiations we commit
ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial
improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to
phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial
53
reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.” Nonetheless,
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 largely
reaffirmed the use of domestic agricultural subsidies. Subsidies
could, again, potentially be affirmed under the Agriculture
54
Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012.
D. RESPONSE BY THE WTO
1. Agreement on Agriculture
In 1994, the World Trade Organization signed the
Agreement on Agriculture [hereinafter Agreement] as part of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
55
Organization. The Agreement’s objective is to “establish a fair
and market-oriented agricultural trading system and that a
reform process should be initiated through the negotiation of
56
commitments on support and protection . . . .” In order to
advance that objective, the WTO sought to cap the amount of
52. Mark Malloch Brown, Dev. Programme Adm’r, United Nations, The
Millennium Development Goals and Africa: A New Framework for a New
Future (Nov. 12, 2002), http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2002/november
/mmb-uganda.en?src=print (discussing the development goals for Africa of
poverty reduction, educational development and health reform through the
means of trade concessions, debt relief and increased development assistance).
53. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at 3 (2001) (re-emphasizing the goals expressed in
the Uruguay round of trade negotiations and in the Geneva Framework
regarding reduction of domestic subsidies in order to create market access for
developing countries).
54. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 8701–8793 (2008).
55. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 [hereinafter
Agreement on Agriculture].
56. Id. (quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Decisions
Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8, 1989, 28
I.L.M. 1023, 1027).
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subsidies a nation could annually provide to domestic farmers
57
in an effort to limit trade-distorting measures. “Trade
distortion occurs in the [international] market when an
agricultural producer’s level of production or a commodity’s
price is higher or lower than it would be absent government
58
interference.” Article 6 of the Agreement requires each WTO
member to refrain from providing agricultural subsidies in any
given year in excess of the maximum amount specified for that
59
state. The Agreement calls the amount of funds that a
government actually distributes in trade-distorting subsides
the Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support (Current
60
Total AMS). The WTO designated the U.S. maximum at $19.1
61
billion per year for trade-distorting, agricultural subsidies.
The WTO divides subsidies into three different categories,
termed boxes, ranging from the most trade-distorting subsidies
62
to least trade-distorting. The WTO categorizes the most trade63
distorting subsidies as “amber box” supports. Amber box
supports include domestic policies which directly affect
64
production and trade. Blue box supports fall in the middle
57. Id. (“[r]ecalling further that ‘the. . . long-term objective is to provide
for substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection
sustained over’ . . . the following areas: market access; domestic support;
export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and
phytosanitary issues;” (quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Decisions Adopted at the Mid-Term Review of the Uruguay Round, Apr. 8,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1023, 1027)).
58. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1215; see e.g., UNDERSTANDING THE WTO,
supra note 8, at 26 (“For example, import barriers and domestic subsidies can
make crops more expensive on a country’s internal market. The higher prices
can encourage over-production. If the surplus is to be sold on world markets,
where prices are lower, then export subsidies are needed. As a result, the
subsidizing countries can be producing and exporting considerably more than
they normally would.”).
59. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 55.
60. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1223.
61. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 55 (explaining how a country
must calculate its Current Total AMS); see also Robert Zoellick, U.S. Trade
Representative, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Conference
with USTR Zoellick at the Conclusion of WTO General Council Meeting (Aug.
1, 2004), http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Transcripts/2004/
August/Transcript_of_Press_Conference_with_USTR_Zoellick_At_the_Conclus
ion_of_WTO_General_Council_Meeting,_Geneva,_Switzerl.html
(specifying
that the U.S. Allowed Total AMS is roughly $19.1 billion per year).
62. UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 8, at 28–29.
63. See id.
64. Id. (“Domestic policies that do have a direct effect on production and
trade have to be cut back . . . . Developed countries agreed to reduce these
figures by 20% over six years starting in 1995. Developing countries agreed to
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category, which provide payments to farmers but require them
65
to limit production. Lastly, green box subsidies have very
66
little to no trade-distorting effects. The Agreement only
67
requires states to reduce their amber box subsidies. Therefore,
the U.S. needs to reduce its amber box subsidies to $19.1 billion
68
or less in order to comply with the Agreement.
2. The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures
When the WTO was created, the Member countries
established a dispute settlement body (DSB) to govern trade
69
disputes between countries. Article 3.2 of the DSU states,
“[t]he dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the
make 13% cuts over 10 years. Least-developed countries do not need to make
any cuts. (This category of domestic support is sometimes called the ‘amber
box’.)”).
65. Id. at 29 (“Also permitted, are certain direct payments to farmers
where the farmers are required to limit production (sometimes called ‘blue box’
measures), certain government assistance programmes to encourage
agricultural and rural development in developing countries, and other support
on a small scale (‘de minimis’) when compared with the total value of the
product or products supported (5% or less in the case of developed countries
and 10% or less for developing countries).”).
66. Id. (“Measures with minimal impact on trade can be used freely – they
are in a ‘green box’ . . . . They include government services such as research,
disease control, infrastructure and food security. They also include payments
made directly to farmers that do not stimulate production, such as certain
forms of direct income support, assistance to help farmers restructure
agriculture, and direct payments under environmental and regional assistance
programmes.”); see also World Trade Organization, Agriculture Negotiations:
Background Fact Sheet, Domestic Support in Agriculture (Oct. 1, 2002),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/agboxes_e.htm
(providing
an
overview of the three boxes and how they are defined).
67. Bullington, supra note 3, at 1224.
68. Id. (footnotes omitted) (“The Agreement on Agriculture does not
require Member States to reduce the amount of any domestic subsidies except
for amber box subsidies, which are the only subsidies that count toward a
Member State’s spending limit. Since the U.S. Allowed Total AMS is $19.1
billion, the total amount of amber box support the United States may spend is
also $19.1 billion.”).
69. Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization art. 2, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS 405 (1994), Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S 401 [hereinafter DSU].
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70

multilateral trading system.” Article 3.3 further states that
“the prompt settlement of situations in which a Member
considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly
under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures
taken by another Member is essential to the effective
71
functioning of the WTO.”
By conferring compulsory
jurisdiction on the DSB to overhear trade disputes, the DSU
establishes a governing body to ensure the equitable balance of
72
domestic and international trade policies.
The DSU specifically focuses on incorporating the interests
of developing countries. Article 4.10 of the DSU states that
Members must “give special attention to the particular
problems and interests of developing country Members” in the
73
consultation process.
The DSU repeatedly notes that
developing countries should be afforded preferential treatment
74
in dispute settlement before the WTO. The WTO thus has
addressed the need to rebalance the disparity in economic
75
power between developed and developing nations.
The DSU also instituted harsher remedies for successful
challenges to prejudicial trade policies in order to achieve
76
stricter enforcement. In the GATT system that preceded the
DSU, remedies attempted to rebalance trade agreements
77
between Member nations. However, the DSU has instead
taken a stricter approach by inducing compliance rather than
78
rebalancing trade agreements. WTO case law reaffirms this
approach in every Article 22.6 report, which always state that
the purpose of countermeasures, or the suspension of
70. Id. art. 3.2.
71. Id. art. 3.3.
72. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 16 (2nd ed.
2004).
73. DSU, supra note 69, at art. 4.10; see also PALMETER & MAVROIDIS ,
supra note 72, at 174.
74. See DSU, supra note 69, at arts. 3.12 & 12.10.
75. Id.
76. See SHERZOD SHADIKHODJAEV, RETALIATION IN THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 28 (Ross Buckley, et al. eds., 19th ed. 2009) (“In a
number of arbitration cases, it was underlined that a ‘key objective’ or ‘one of
the recognized purposes’ of retaliation is to induce the losing party to comply
with the DSB recommendation and ruling”).
77. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 72, at 301; see also KENNETH W.
DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 80
(Chicago, 1970).
78. SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 28–29.
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concessions, is to induce compliance, rather than to rebalance
79
concessions. The DSU therefore takes a stronger regulatory
approach to correcting the economic power gap and to
encouraging developing countries to take advantage of the
80
dispute settlement system.
Furthermore, the WTO instituted the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafter SCM
81
Agreement] for further regulation of prejudicial subsidies.
“The underlying aim of this Agreement is to balance the
concern that domestic industries should not be put at an unfair
disadvantage by competition from foreign goods which benefit
from subsidies, and the concern that countervailing measures
offsetting those subsidies should not create unnecessary
82
barriers to trade.” Article 27 of the SCM Agreement also lays
83
down special rules for developing countries. The DSU and the
SCM Agreement seek to create an equitable balance of
domestic subsidies and market access for developing countries
and to institute the procedures and remedies required to
84
enforce that balance.
E. BRAZIL’S COTTON SUBSIDY CHALLENGE
In 2002, Brazil initiated WTO dispute settlement
proceedings against the U.S. claiming that the U.S. violated its
obligations under the SCM agreement. Brazil’s claim included
the proposition that, by failing to abide by WTO regulations on
agricultural subsidies, the U.S. caused serious prejudice to
85
Brazil’s cotton industry. Brazil alleged that U.S. cotton
79. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the
European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 6.3
WT/DS27/ARB/ECU, DSR 2000:V, 2243 (Mar. 24, 2000).
80. SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 28–29.
81. Id. at 95.
82. Id. at 95–96; see also WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS 96 (Kluwer Law Int’l ed., 1999).
83. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 27, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 42 [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (“Members
recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic development
programmes of developing country Members”).
84. DSU, supra note 69, at arts. 3.12. &12.10; see also SHADIKHODJAEV,
supra note 76 , at 95
85. Panel Report, U.S. – Subsidies on Upland Cotton, at 2-3, WT/DS267/R
(Sept. 8, 2004) (requesting the DSB panel to rule that U.S. subsidies had
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subsidies significantly suppress prices of cotton internationally,
86
causing significant losses to Brazil’s cotton industry.
The WTO arbitrator ruled largely in Brazil’s favor finding
that the U.S. had violated its obligations under Article 6.3 of
the SCM Agreement. Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement states:
Serious prejudice . . . may arise in any case where one
or several of the following apply: (a) the effect of the
subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like
product of another Member into the market of the
subsidizing Member; (b) the effect of the subsidy is to
displace or impede the exports of a like product of
another Member from a third country market; (c) the
effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting
by the subsidized product as compared with the price
of a like product of another Member in the same
market or significant price suppression, price
depression or lost sales in the same market; (d) the
effect of the subsidy is an increase in the world
market share of the subsidizing Member in a
particular subsidized primary product or commodity
as compared to the average share it had during the
previous period of three years and this increase
follows a consistent trend over a period when
87
subsidies have been granted.
The WTO arbitration panel found that, based on an
economic analysis, U.S. counter-cyclical cotton subsidies
88
suppressed international prices by $2.9 billion each year. In
order to enforce the ruling, the WTO allowed Brazil to enact
retaliatory trade measures against the U.S. until the U.S.
either ended the counter-cyclical and marketing loan programs
or remedied the prejudicial price suppression on all affected
89
countries, not just Brazil. However, the panel only allowed
Brazil to enact trade measures in the amount that the U.S.
suppressed cotton prices in U.S., Brazil and world markets, thereby violating
SCM Articles 5(c) and 6.3(c)).
86. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter ABR Cotton].
87. SCM Agreement, supra note 83, at art. 5 (stating that WTO members
may not use subsidies that cause prejudice to the domestic industry of another
member).
88. See ABR Cotton, supra note 86.
89. See id.
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cotton subsidies affected Brazil’s cotton prices, not global cotton
prices. The U.S. subsidies affected global cotton prices in the
90
amount of $147.3 million.
The Brazil–U.S. cotton dispute set an important legal
precedent for future challenges in the WTO’s dispute
settlement process. First, the arbitration panel ruled that price
suppression suffices to establish a violation of the SCM
91
agreement. Second, the panel used an economic analysis to
quantify that prejudice in financial terms, which provides a
92
basis for remedies. Third, the WTO allowed Brazil to enact
retaliatory measures against the U.S. in the amount that the
U.S. cotton subsidies affected Brazil’s cotton industry. It also
allowed them to continue those measures until the U.S. aligned
93
its subsidies program with WTO regulations. The WTO’s
arbitration ruling on the U.S. cotton subsidies provides a
blueprint for other countries initiating challenges against
94
countries that violate WTO subsidy regulations. In 2007, both
Canada and Brazil initiated dispute settlement proceedings
95
against the U.S. regarding its prejudicial subsidies. Both
countries, however, have agreed to postpone proceedings
96
pending further WTO trade negotiations.
The Cotton decision provides a legal precedent for
countries that successfully challenge a prejudicial subsidy to
retaliate with trade measures until the respondent country
remedies the prejudicial effect or eliminates the prejudicial
subsidies. However, the remaining question is whether these
measures are sufficient to incentivize smaller developing
countries to use the dispute settlement system.
II.

ANALYSIS

While the WTO has made significant strides in creating a
judicial system that is more easily accessible to developing
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6.
Id. at 4.
See id.
Id. at 6.
See generally RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34351,
BRAZIL’S AND CANADA’S WTO CASES AGAINST U.S. AGRICULTURAL DIRECT
PAYMENTS (2010) (detailing the legal arguments made by Canada and Brazil
against direct payment subsidies and the possible political and policy
ramification for Congress).
96. Id. at 1.
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countries, it has yet to provide sufficient access to smaller
developing countries. Moreover, access is irrelevant if smaller
developing countries fail to use the system. The WTO therefore
needs also to provide sufficient incentives in the form of
remedies for smaller developing countries to encourage them to
use the WTO dispute resolution system.
While the WTO has allowed Brazil to enact $147.3 million
of retaliatory trade measures against the U.S., the U.S. has yet
to repeal either the marketing loan program subsidy or the
97
counter-cyclical subsidy. In 2007, Brazil filed an additional
complaint in the WTO system over other U.S. domestic subsidy
policies in frustration over the lack of cotton subsidy reforms by
98
the U.S. Policy reform, however, is still a work in progress.
The U.S. Senate has passed the Agriculture Reform, Food and
Jobs Act of 2012, which must now pass the House of
99
Representatives. The legislation proposes to end countercyclical subsidies, direct payment subsidies and alter the
marketing loan program. This initiative would rein in
prejudicial subsidies and would comply with the WTO’s
100
decision. However, there has been strong opposition to the
101
bill. Whether it will pass the House remains unanswered.
Unable to resolve issues with the bill, Congress allowed the
102
previous farm bill to expire on September 30, 2012.
97. See ABR Cotton, supra note 86.
98. See generally SCHNEPF RL34351, supra note 95.
99. Agriculture Reform, Food and Jobs Act of 2012, S. Res. 3240, 112th
Cong, (2012).
100. See id.
101. Brandon Arnold & Sallie James, Plenty of Blame to Go Around on
Farm Bill Travesty, THE CATO INSTITUTE (Nov. 14, 2002, 2:47 PM),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/plenty-blame-go-around-farmbill-travesty (“[T]he top House Republican, Rep. John Boehner (Ohio), has
openly stated his opposition to the farm bill. ‘The [legislation] . . . extends
flawed policies that keep American farmers dependent on government
subsidies and discourage other countries from opening their markets to
American farm export,’ he noted in a May 13 letter to a colleague. ‘This
approach doesn't help American farmers — it hurts them. We shouldn't
support it.’”); see also Keith Collins & Harun Bulut, Crop Insurance and the
Future Farm Safety Net, 26 CHOICES: THE MAGAZINE OF FOOD, FARM AND
RESOURCE ISSUES 1, 3 (2011), http://www.choicesmagazine.org/choicesmagazine/submitted-articles/crop-insurance-and-the-future-farm-safety-net
(“Sharp cuts in premium subsidies, delivery cost payments to companies, and
Federal reinsurance would likely generate significant opposition from
producers, companies, and farm suppliers.”).
102. Marni Salmon, Food Fight: A Case Study of the Community Food
Security Coalition’s Campaign for a Fair Farm Bill, CAPSTONE COLLECTION 9
(July 2012) (M.A. thesis, SIT Institute) (“The Food, Conservation and Energy
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While retaliatory trade measures incentivize developed
countries to reform policies when the measures come from a
country like Brazil with significant economic power, these
measures have less influence when instituted by countries with
103
a smaller economy. Brazil has the seventh largest GDP in the
104
world at $2.32 trillion annually.
If a country with such
economic clout has had trouble convincing the U.S. to change
its domestic subsidy policies, how would a country like Nigeria
105
fare with an annual GDP of roughly $418 billion? Nigeria is
not even one of the world’s least developing countries (LDC),
which have barely taken advantage of the WTO dispute
106
system.
The WTO must find some way to balance the
economic power gap between larger developing countries, like
Brazil, and smaller developing countries, like Nigeria.
Although the WTO initiated the DSU with the intention of
encouraging use of the dispute settlement system for smaller
107
developing countries,
it has largely failed in that goal.
Developing countries have used the WTO dispute settlement
108
system more than the GATT system, but the statistics on
access for developing countries are misleading. While 40% of
the complaints filed in the dispute system have been from
developing countries, only five countries account for 60% of

Act of 2008, more commonly known as the 2008 Farm Bill, expires on
September 30, 2012.”).
103. Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dispute
Settlement, 9 CHI.-KENT J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 130, 131–32 (2009)
104. CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications
/the-world-factbook/geos/br.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
105. Id.
106. Bangladesh is the only least-developed country to initiate dispute
settlement proceedings in India – Anti-Dumping Measure on Batteries from
Bangladesh, WT/DS306/1 (Feb. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Anti-Dumping Measure].
107. Bohl, supra note 103, at 133 (“The WTO negotiators plainly intended
to encourage developing countries to use the system, as demonstrated by
‘special and differential treatment’ provisions laid out across the various WTO
agreements. These provisions specifically deviate from the general rules, and
they provide special rights ‘which give developed countries the possibility to
treat developing countries more favorably than other WTO Members.’ The text
of the DSU alone contains at least eleven such provisions by which developing
countries should enjoy.”); see also DSU, supra note 69, at art. 21.2 ( “Particular
attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests of developing
country Members with respect to measures which have been subject to dispute
settlement.”); Bohl, supra note 103, at 32 fn.8.
108. See generally Bohl, supra note 103, at 131–33 (noting that larger
developing countries have made greater use of the dispute settlement system
in recent years).
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those complaints. Thirteen countries account for 90% of them.
In fact, no country in Africa or in the Middle East has ever
110
initiated a complaint in the WTO dispute system. Currently,
ninety-five of the WTO’s 120 non-OECD countries have never
111
filed a complaint before the WTO. Only one least-developed
112
country has ever filed a WTO complaint. As it stands, the
WTO dispute system principally benefits the most economically
113
powerful countries.
This problem exists for two overarching reasons: access
and incentive. First, smaller developing countries do not have
114
the same access to the WTO’s dispute settlement system.
Second, the remedies that the WTO offers to successful
claimants do not incentivize smaller developing countries to
initiate timely and costly dispute settlement proceedings
115
against developed countries. The problem of access has been
extensively addressed above. The second problem is a more
novel concept and becomes more relevant in light of the recent
Cotton decision.
A. IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS TO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM
Before discussing the issues of developing countries’ access
to and incentive to use the WTO’s dispute settlement system,
this Note addresses why access to the system is important.
First, access to the WTO dispute system has generally worked

109. Gregory Shaffer, Developing Country Use of the WTO Dispute
Settlement System: Why it Matters, the Barriers Posed, in TRADE DISPUTES
AND THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WTO: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY ASSESSMENT, at 167, 177 (Frontiers of Econ. &
Globalization vol. 6, 2009).
110. Id. This point is especially egregious, because African countries have
the largest potential for agricultural growth, and are definitely affected. See
generally World Bank, Agriculture: Value Added (Annual % Growth), DATA,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.KD.ZG (last visited Nov. 4,
2012) (providing each country’s annual growth rate for agricultural value
added).
111. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 177.
112. See generally Anti-Dumping Measure, supra note 106.
113. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 103, at 131–32
114. See Shaffer, supra note 109; see also Obijiofor Aginam, Food Safety,
South-North Asymmetries, and the Clash of Regulatory Regimes, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1099 (2007); Bohl, supra note 103.
115. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 182.

OLSON Article

2014]

2/25/2014 10:13 AM

INCENTIVIZING ACCESS TO THE WTO

119

116

for larger countries. Three years after favorable adjudication
by the WTO regarding the complainant’s affected goods, the
complainants’ exports of the affected goods to the respondent
117
countries increased substantially. Successful claimants have
used the WTO system to balance regulations affecting
international trade and have increased their market access,
118
which is essential for developing countries.
However, the
successful claimants have generally been economically powerful
countries.
Secondly, WTO jurisprudence not only affects the
participating countries in dispute settlement, but shapes the
119
perceptions of international trade law. Just as with the U.S.
legislation, when Congress leaves its interpretation and
application to the court system, so too do international
agreements require interpretation by a judicial body. Neither
the legislation nor the judicial system can foresee every
120
circumstance. The WTO dispute system serves this function,
but fails to do so if smaller developing countries do not use the
system, leaving prejudicial policies unchallenged. Furthermore,
when countries use the dispute system, it provides both
precedent and guidelines for other countries in similar
121
disputes. This point is illustrated by in the Cotton case. Now
that Brazil has navigated the complexities of challenging a
domestic subsidy, other countries can use similar tools as a
122
blueprint for successful challenges.
The WTO panel used a
number of novel approaches in determining the prejudicial
effect of U.S. cotton subsidies on the international cotton
market, including economic models to prove price
123
suppression. The panel also determined that subsidies can
116. Id. at 169–70; see also David Evans & Gregory C. Shaffer, Conclusion,
in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AT THE WTO: THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY
EXPERIENCE 342, 342–43 (Gregory C. Shaffer & Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz eds.,
2010).
117. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 171 (citing Chad Bown, On the Economic
Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 811
(2004)).
118. Id. at 170.
119. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 172.
120. Id.
121. See Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6.
122. See id. at 5. (“[I]t will be considerably easier for future complaining
party litigants to plan and prosecute successfully their serious prejudice
challenges because of the lessons learned from the Cotton decisions.”).
123. Id .at 6 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he Arbitrators confirmed the viability
and utility of particular types of econometric models to assess the effects of
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substantially prejudice a well-functioning international market
by significantly suppressing prices and that this can be
124
demonstrated causally.
Both Canada and Brazil have
initiated WTO disputes against the U.S. regarding its domestic
125
subsidy policies.
The findings in the Cotton decision will
provide significant guidance for these countries in their
126
disputes.
Third, a failure to participate in the WTO dispute system
127
allows prejudicial subsidies to continue unchecked.
Price
suppressing subsidies force developing countries’ farmers to
produce and export more commodities to keep up with the
international market, which has a detrimental effect on the
128
social welfare of a country. By successfully challenging these
prejudicial subsidies, countries can remove these effects,
resulting in the improvement of both their agricultural sector
129
and the social welfare of their country.
Lastly, WTO law can affect domestic and bilateral political
130
negotiations. WTO retaliatory measures force governments to
consider how costly their protective policies are in light of those
131
retaliatory trade measures. For example, after $147.3 million
of Brazilian trade retaliation, the U.S. will have to consider the
economic and political ramifications of continuing their cotton
132
subsidies.
While it may not unilaterally change domestic
133
policies, it will be a significant future consideration.
subsidies . . . . The use of such models is crucial given the counterfactual
nature of the entire serious prejudice question, i.e. whether, but for the
subsidies, world prices would have been higher. Future complaining parties
can adopt and adapt as necessary these models in preparing future challenges.
This will significantly facilitate the defense of such models.”).
124. Id. at 5–6.
125. See generally RANDY SCHNEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33853,
CANADA CORN TRADE DISPUTE (2007) (explaining Canada’s legal dispute
against U.S. corn subsidies and noting possible policy ramification if the
dispute should succeed).
126. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6.
127. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 171.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 172.
131. Cf. Robert W. Staiger & Guido Tabellini, Do GATT rules help
governments make domestic commitments?, 11 ECON. & POL. 109 (1999)
(showing that the GATT and WTO rules, including possible retaliations from
trading partners in response to the violation of the rules, have influence on
governments’ trade policies).
132. See SCHNEPF RL 33853, supra note 125, at 11.
133. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 173–74; see also Marc Busch & Eric
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Regarding bilateral negotiations, the WTO case law
significantly affects future decisions since the case law is not as
134
developed as the U.S. common law. Because WTO rulings can
significantly affect future decisions, the most frequent
complainants can shape the law, thus tipping the scales of
135
international trade law in their favor. This becomes a distinct
advantage in negotiations following a judicial decision by the
WTO, because policies are generally changed through political
negotiations informed by the decision, rather than an
enforcement mechanism by the WTO (the Cotton dispute is an
136
exception). Therefore, developed countries that use the WTO
dispute settlement system much more frequently garner a
significant political advantage over smaller developed countries
137
that rarely use the system. For these reasons, in order to
sufficiently represent the interests of smaller developing
countries, the WTO must increase their access to dispute
settlement.
B. PRINCIPAL OBSTACLES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’
ACCESS TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
In order to determine how to increase smaller developing
countries’ access to WTO dispute resolution, we must assess
the obstacles to their access. There are several factors that
affect smaller developing countries’ failure to use the WTO’s
dispute settlement system. One of the most prohibitive factors
138
is the cost of litigation. In Chile – Price Band System and
Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products,
filed by Argentina in 2000, the Association of Argentine Edible
Oil Industries paid approximately $400,000 to a law firm just
139
for the first draft of a demand. Other countries willingly pay
Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in
GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 158 (showing that GATT/WTO
adverse rulings, despite their lack of enforcement power, have induced
settlements between future parties.).
134. See generally Shaffer, supra note 109, at 168–69 (discussing the
development of international trade case law).
135. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 173–74.
136. Id. at 174.
137. Id. at 173.
138. See, e.g., Bohl, supra note 103 , at 144–51; Shaffer, supra note 109, at
183–85.
139. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 183 (citing Diana Tussie & Valentina
Delich, The Political Economy of Dispute Settlement: A Case from Argentina,
Latin Am. Trade Network, Working Paper No. 33, 2004).
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much more in legal fees. In the U.S.-EC Boeing Airbus dispute,
140
legal fees ran up to approximately $1 million per month.
Specifically regarding agricultural subsidies in the Cotton
dispute, Brazil’s cotton trade association paid roughly $2
141
million in legal fees. Providing sufficient evidence to prove a
link between U.S. domestic policy and international price
suppression required extremely resource intensive measures,
142
including statistical analyses and quantifiable economic data.
Brazil can more easily pay these fees with its annual GDP of
$2.32 trillion, but a country like Uganda, whose annual GDP is
143
roughly $17 billion, will struggle to cover that cost. The costs
associated with complex dispute settlement proceedings
144
provide a significant barrier to developing country access.
The WTO has made strides in this area by allowing
developing countries to participate in the WTO litigation at a
subsidized rate through the Advisory Centre on WTO Law
145
(ACWL). Each member country contributes to the ACWL,
which then charges developing countries with an “economy in
transition” at various rates. The rates depend on the countries’
146
size and ability to pay. The Center also provides free legal
147
advice on WTO law. Moreover, it places special emphasis on
the least-developed countries by automatically granting those
148
countries access to its services. The ACWL has had relative
success thus far in the dispute system. From 2001 to 2008, it
had provided support in thirty-seven dispute settlement
proceedings, which constituted over 20% of the proceedings
149
during that time.
With an emphasis on increasing
participation by developing countries, the ACWL constitutes a
significant step towards a more equitable judicial system in the
140. Id. at 184.
141. Id. at 183.
142. See generally Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37.
143. CIA: THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications
/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
144. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 184–85.
145. See Agreement Establishing the Advisory Centre On WTO Law, Nov.
30, 1999, 2299 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter ACWL Agreement]; see also Shaffer,
supra note 109, at 184 (“The Advisory Centre on WTO Law enables developing
countries to participate at subsidized rates and has represented an important
development for the system.”). But see Bohl, supra note 103, at 146–47.
146. ACWL Agreement, supra note 145, annex IV (explaining the various
rates charged for different services).
147. Id.
148. Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 347.
149. Id.
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150

WTO.
However, the prohibitive cost of litigation represents only
the threshold of issues restricting smaller developing countries’
access to the WTO dispute system. Even at subsidized rates, a
country must have the legal resources and sophistication to
151
engage in complex and costly litigation. Even if a country had
the necessary funds to pay the legal costs, countries with weak
infrastructure lack the capacity to develop a factually sufficient
case and provide the necessary support to a law firm to manage
152
a case. This rings especially true in factually intensive cases
like the Cotton dispute, which required extensive economic
analysis of the effects of U.S. cotton subsidies on the
153
international market. Performing such an analysis requires
expert witness research and testimony. Smaller developing
countries may not have the infrastructure to provide the WTO
Advisory Centre with the necessary information to perform
154
such analyses. Furthermore, both extensive research and an
administrative infrastructure are required to detect such
prejudicial effects. Many governments of developing countries
do not have the institutional capacity to investigate how foreign
subsidies affect domestic industries, especially when there are
155
more pressing domestic issues.
Moreover, there is a wide gap in the relative stakes in
WTO litigation between a developed country and a smaller
156
developing country.
A prejudicial subsidy could affect a
country like Nigeria as much as Brazil, but the relative stakes
for Brazil are much higher because of its economic size. Thus,
due to the aggregate stakes, the nature of the WTO system
does more to encourage economically powerful countries to
157
initiate disputes than those less powerful. In a study of U.S.–
EC trade disputes, Marc Busch and Eric Reihardt ranked
150. See id.; see also Bohl, supra note 103, at 188
151. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 184.
152. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 344.
153. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 6.
154. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 344.
155. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 184 (“[A] poor country must consider
the greater opportunity costs confronting it on account of its scarce
resources.”).
156. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 343 (citing Hagan Nordstrom
& Gregory Shaffer, Access to Justice in the World Trade Organization: The
Case for a Small Claims Procedure: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 WORLD TRADE
REV. 587 (2008)).
157. See Shaffer, supra note 109, at 182.
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disputes that involved an excess of $150 million in annual
158
trade as a high stakes dispute. However, $150 million “only
represented about .0015% of U.S. gross domestic product at
that time (2001). A claim of comparable importance for
159
Honduras would equal around $255,000.”
A high stakes
dispute for a country like Honduras, which is not even
considered a least-developed country, is much lower than a
160
high stakes dispute for a larger country. “[A] million dollars
in foregone export revenue may not matter much for the
European Union or the U.S.; it would only be a few seconds’
worth of exports. Yet for small developing countries like
Burundi, Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, one million dollars
161
corresponds to about 1.45% of annual exports . . . .” It is,
therefore, difficult for a smaller developing country to bring a
claim of significance against a developed country like the U.S.
The WTO needs to create solutions for overcoming this gap in
economic power.
Smaller developing countries must also consider the
opportunity cost in pursuing dispute settlement. When legal
fees could cost an excess of several million dollars, a country
must evaluate whether the harm to its own agricultural market
162
justifies incurring the expense of litigation. In the Cotton
dispute, the WTO panel found that U.S. cotton subsidies had
cost the Brazilian cotton industry roughly $147.3 million, which
arguably justifies the $2 million it paid in legal fees. A much
smaller developing country, however, may suffer a
proportionately equal harm, but because of its significantly
smaller cotton industry and GDP, U.S. subsidies would harm it
significantly less than $147.3 million. Nonetheless, the costs
associated with litigating the claim are the same for a smaller
developing country as for Brazil (notwithstanding subsidized
measures by the ACWLO) This lesser remedy-same cost
dynamic reduces the potential reward for a developing country
from dispute settlement proceedings. Bown elaborates on this
point when he states, “The formal evidence indicates that,
despite market access interests in a dispute, an exporting
158. See Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC DISPUTES:
THE EU, THE US, AND THE WTO 465, 475 (Ernst-Uhlrich Petersmann & Mark
A. Pollack eds., 2003).
159. Shaffer, supra note 109, at 182.
160. Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 343.
161. Id.
162. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 5.
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country is less likely to participate in WTO litigation if it has
inadequate power for trade retaliation . . . ,” which is a
characteristic
“typically
associated
with
developing
163
countries . . . .”
A smaller developing country must then
evaluate whether it is worth spending several million dollars to
litigate a case in front of the WTO, which may take several
164
years, or whether it should instead import the subsidized
crop at lower costs and allow its own agricultural market to
165
suffer.
Countries must also consider the political ramifications of
initiating a dispute against a more powerful country. The WTO
prohibits any non-authorized, unilateral retaliation between
166
countries. Under the authority of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,
however, the U.S. has in several instances enacted retaliatory
trade measures against a country prior to the dispute
167
settlement body’s authorization of those measures.
The
European Community initiated dispute settlement proceedings
against the U.S. after U.S. efforts to retaliate against the
168
European Community’s banana regime.
Despite its
prohibition on non-authorized trade measures, the WTO ruled
in favor of the provisions in the U.S. Trade Act that allowed for
retaliation prior to authorization by the dispute settlement
body. It stipulated, however, that the U.S. “exercise[d] the
discretion given to it by the statutory language in a way
169
consistent WTO obligations.” Furthermore, the U.S. – Section
301 Trade Act did not resolve the question of whether a country
can threaten to retaliate against a country prior to the
170
resolution of a trade issue by the dispute settlement body.
Korea has identified a list of retaliatory measures itemizing
171
target goods published by the U.S. Political retaliation thus
remains a consideration for smaller developing countries in
163. Chad Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants,
Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 THE WORLD BANK ECON. REVIEW 287,
308 (2005).
164. Id. at 309.
165. Id.
166. Panel Report, U.S.–Import Measures on Certain Products from the
European Communities, ¶ 6.38, WT/DS165/R (July 17, 2000).
167. See SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 36–37.
168. U.S.–Import Measures on Certain Products from the European
Communities, supra note 166.
169. Panel Report, U.S.–Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 7.117,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Section 301 Panel Report].
170. SHADIKHODJAEV, supra note 76, at 38.
171. Section 301 Panel Report, supra note 169, ¶ 5.309.
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initiating WTO dispute resolution.
Political ramifications, however, do not end at retaliatory
measures. Another political consideration for developing
countries is the potential effect that dispute settlement
proceedings may have on future trade negotiations with the
respondent country: “If a developing country government fears
that by bringing a dispute to the WTO it will jeopardize the
stability of its trading relationships, it is unlikely the
172
government will move forward.”
Trade relationships are
delicately formed. Trade disputes under an international body
can disrupt those relationships, which may lead some
173
developing countries to be reluctant to initiate disputes. This
reality is especially true when the developing country relies on
the potential respondent for development assistance and global
174
aid initiatives.
For example, if Nigeria initiates a suit against the U.S. for
prejudicial subsidies on sorghum, it has to consider how much
175
it relies on U.S. imports for its own economy. In 2011, Nigeria
imported $4.8 billion of U.S. goods, including cereals ($1.2
billion), vehicles ($1.1 billion), machinery ($720 million),
176
mineral fuel ($597 million) and plastic ($187 million). Each
one of these imports amounts to more than the amount of
retaliatory trade measures the WTO allowed Brazil to enact
against the U.S. and would be much larger than any prejudicial
effects U.S. sorghum subsidies would have on Nigeria. Beyond
reliance on U.S. imports, Nigeria also significantly relies on
177
U.S. foreign aid.
In 2008, the U.S. estimated giving
approximately $490 million in foreign aid for “increasing
stability through improved social sector service delivery,
particularly
through
HIV/AIDS
programs;
fostering
transparent and accountable governance; promoting a more
market-led economy; and enhancing Nigeria’s capacity as a
178
responsible regional and trade partner.” If Nigeria were to
initiate a suit against the U.S., it would have to consider the
172. Bohl, supra note 103, at 163.
173. Id. at 163.
174. Id. at 164–65.
175. Nigeria, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria (last visited
Nov. 4, 2012).
176. Id.
177. FOREIGN OPERATIONS, CONG. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 286 (2009),
www.state.gov/documents/organization/101368.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2012).
178. Id.
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possible chilling effect on future trade negotiations with the
U.S. Combined with the financial commitment required to
successfully argue a case before the WTO, developing countries
may be reluctant to initiate such a dispute.
These obstacles to accessing the WTO dispute settlement
system have prevented many developing countries from taking
advantage of the system, especially smaller developing
countries. While Brazil, India and China have used the system
extensively, they are also three of the world’s largest
economies. Due to a lack of legal and financial resources, weak
infrastructure, and lack of economic and political clout, smaller
developing countries have not been able to maximize the
benefits of the system. However, access to the dispute system is
not the only impediment preventing these countries from
initiating disputes.
C. RETALIATORY MEASURES PERMITTED IN THE COTTON
DISPUTE ARE INSUFFICIENT TO INCENTIVIZE SMALLER
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO USE THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
The previous issues detail lack of access to the dispute
settlement system for smaller developing countries. However,
access to the system is only a threshold issue. Once these
countries have access to the dispute system, there must be
adequate incentives to use the system. Even if a country like
Nigeria has sufficient access to the dispute settlement system,
the system will not help Nigeria unless the country actually
179
initiates disputes. The WTO, therefore, also needs to offer
sufficient incentives for smaller developing countries to use the
180
dispute settlement system.
Undermining the incentive to use the dispute settlement
system is the lack of a reward that would justify the high costs
of participation. Brazil spent roughly $2 million and six years
to effectively litigate against the U.S. over its prejudicial cotton
subsidies. It has been three years since the WTO allowed Brazil
to enact millions of dollars of retaliatory trade measures
against the U.S. Yet there has been no change in U.S. domestic
181
policy regarding subsidies. The Agricultural Reform, Food
179. See Evans & Shaffer, supra note 116, at 342.
180. See id.
181. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 1.
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and Jobs Act of 2012 proposed to eliminate the bill has been
met with significant opposition not only regarding the
elimination of subsidies, but also the bill’s proposal to increase
182
federal spending by a significant amount. If the remedies are
inadequate to cure the problem, a smaller developing country
would have difficulty justifying spending several years and
millions of dollars litigating a case before the WTO and risking
political alienation from a much more powerful country like the
U.S. If the $147.3 million in retaliatory trade measures are
insufficient to alter U.S. domestic policy, what chance does a
183
smaller developing country have? Without significant reform
of the WTO’s remedies, the prohibitive cost (both financially
and politically) and the minimal reward will prevent
developing countries from taking advantage of the WTO’s
dispute system.
D. THE WTO SHOULD ALLOW COMPLAINANTS TO ENACT
RETALIATORY MEASURES IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT THAT
PREJUDICIAL SUBSIDIES SUPPRESS INTERNATIONAL
PRICES
Policy officials cannot create a solution for every obstacle to
access for developing countries. There will always be political
risk for developing countries initiating disputes against more
powerful countries. However, while there is no silver bullet
solution to the problems of access and incentive for developing
countries, there are opportunities for reform in the dispute
settlement system that would provide a greater incentive to
countries with smaller economies to initiate disputes.
Primarily, the WTO needs to make remedies for successful
claimants significant enough to justify the financial and
resource investment that countries have to make in complex
184
WTO litigation. In the Cotton dispute, the remedies that the
arbitration panel provided set an insufficient precedent for
developing countries trying to take action against prejudicial
185
agricultural subsidies. Brazil argued it should have been able
182. Arnold & James, supra note 101.
183. See Bown, supra note 163, at 827 (“Our formal evidence indicates that,
despite market access interests in a dispute, an exporting country is less likely
to participate in WTO litigation if it has inadequate power for trade
retaliation”).
184. Id.
185. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 37, at 5.
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to enact retaliatory measures in excess of $1 billion, because
U.S. cotton subsidies had suppressed international cotton
186
prices by roughly $2.9 billion each year. However, the court
determined that Brazil could only suspend concession in
proportion with its market share, which at the time was
187
roughly 5%. Therefore, the court only allowed Brazil to enact
188
measures up to a total of $147.3 million per year. While this
number is not insignificant and could ultimately cause the U.S.
to eliminate its prejudicial subsidies, it does not encourage
smaller developing countries to initiate a dispute. In 2011,
Brazil was the world’s fifth largest producer of cotton,
189
producing 8,700 bales of cotton. If a country like Nigeria,
which is the nineteenth largest producer of cotton, producing
190
325 bales of cotton in 2011 , were to enact retaliatory
measures against the U.S., the measures would not likely
induce the U.S. to change its policies. Expanding the
retaliatory measures (to account for the total amount of price
suppression caused by market-distorting subsidies) would
provide smaller developing countries a much greater incentive
to initiate dispute settlement proceedings, because the size of
their economy would not serve as a cap on the amount of their
damage claims.
Some might argue that countries can join litigation as a
third party and receive remedy accordingly. Article 10 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding allows for third parties to
join a dispute if they have a substantial interest in the matter
191
and have notified the dispute settlement body. Critics may
argue that this provision sufficiently protects the interests of
smaller developing countries. For example, if U.S. sorghum
subsidies prejudice a country like Nigeria, Nigeria can join
several other countries in a dispute against the U.S. for
violation of its obligations under the Agreement on Agriculture
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Crop
Data,
NATIONAL
COTTON
COUNCIL
OF
AMERICA,
http://www.cotton.org/econ/cropinfo/cropdata/rankings.cfm (select “2008”; then
select “Production”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
190. Id.
191. DSU, supra note 69, at art. 10(2) (“Any Member having a substantial
interest in a matter before a panel and having notified its interest to the
DSB . . . shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make
written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be given to the
parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the panel report.”); see also
PALMETER & MAVROIDIS , supra note 72, at 109–10.
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and the SCM Agreement.
In some instances, this approach has been successful. Most
notably, the European Union and ten Latin American nations
just recently settled a long-standing dispute regarding EU
192
tariffs on banana imports. Costa Rica originally filed the
complaint in 1991, but soon Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela
193
joined as well. While Costa Rica alone could not induce the
EU into negotiating for a reduction in banana import tariffs,
the collective economic power of ten Latin American countries
194
eventually compelled this result. Critics of more stringent
retaliatory measures might point to this dispute as an example
of how the dispute settlement system sufficiently protects the
interests of smaller developing countries.
There are several issues, however, with such a proposition.
First, there is little incentive for a country to join in litigation
when a larger country has already taken on the task because
the damages sought are not financial damages, but rather a
removal of prejudicial subsidies by the respondent party. For
example, in U.S. - Safeguard on Circular Welded Pipe from
Korea, which concerned the U.S.’s implementation of a WTOinconsistent protectionist policy, Korea sought an elimination
195
of the trade barrier as a remedy. No financial damages were
sought. In this instance, several other countries and regional
entities did participate in the dispute, such as Japan and the
196
EU. However, as Bown states:
[O]ther adversely affected exporting countries, such as
South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela, did not formally
participate in the dispute. Undoubtedly they hoped to
free ride and enjoy market access benefits generated
by the formal litigants’ efforts to liberalize the
safeguard-protected market . . . as WTO rules
192. Garry White, Banana Prices Set to Fall After 20-year Tariffs 'War’
Ends, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 14, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance
/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/9667773/Banana-prices-set-to-fall-after-20year-tariffs-war-ends.html.
193. Press Release, General Pascal Lamy, Former WTO Director, Lamy
Hails Accord Ending Long Running Banana Dispute (Dec. 15, 2009).
194. Id.
195. Request for Consultations by the European Communities, U.S. –
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular
Welded Quality Line Pipe, WT/DS214/1 (Dec. 7, 2000).
196. Bown, supra note 163, at 813.
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197

require.

Similarly, Nigeria did not have to file written submissions
to the WTO in the Cotton dispute, because its interests were
already protected. Therefore, Nigeria would not have benefitted
from joining in the Cotton dispute, even if it were adversely
affected by U.S. cotton subsidies. Simply, they could achieve
the same result by not joining the dispute and risking political
alienation.
While in the above example Nigeria would still have its
trade interests protected and, therefore, would not need further
access to the dispute system, other situations could arise in
which its interests would not be sufficiently protected. The
WTO cannot expect smaller developing countries to
continuously rely on larger countries to take up the banner for
them in settlement proceedings. Policy shortcomings aside,
while such an approach may work with certain crops that both
larger and smaller developing countries rely on, such as cotton
or corn, it could achieve undesirable results with other crops.
For example, the U.S. currently subsidizes sorghum production
198
in the same way that it subsidizes cotton production. In 2008,
the U.S. issued roughly $314 million of sorghum subsidies to
199
U.S. farmers.
The U.S. is the world’s leading sorghum
producer, producing roughly 12 million tons of sorghum in
2008, which equals approximately 18.04% of the world’s market
200
share.
The next leading producer is Nigeria, producing
roughly 9 million tons of sorghum in 2008, equaling roughly
201
14.04% of the world’s market share.
The next leading
producers in 2008 were India, Mexico and (former) Sudan, with
202
11.95, 9.96 and 5.83% of the market share, respectively. With
the largest market share outside the U.S., Nigeria likely cannot
197. Id.
198. 7 U.S.C. §§ 8702, 8713, 8714 (2008).
199. The United States Summary Information, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING
GROUP FARM SUBSIDIES, http://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode
=total&yr=2008 (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
200. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT,
http://faostat.fao.org/site/ 567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567#ancor (under
“country” select “United States of America,” “Nigeria,” “India,” “Mexico,” and
“Sudan (former)”; under “element” select “Production Capacity”; under “year”
select “2008”; under “item” select “sorghum” click “show data”) (last visited
Nov. 4, 2012).
201. Id.
202. Id.
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rely on a larger developing country to initiate a dispute against
the U.S. Because the world sorghum market is substantially
203
smaller than the world cotton market,
the amount that
Nigeria would theoretically be allowed to enact in retaliatory
trade measures against the U.S. would be substantially smaller
than the amount that Brazil was allowed to enact in the Cotton
dispute. While the exact price suppression would have to be
calculated through economic analyses, it is unlikely that such
an amount would be sufficient for the U.S. to alter its domestic
policy. Reliance on economically powerful countries may, in
some instances, protect the interests of smaller developing
countries. However, these countries cannot always rely on more
economically powerful countries to fight their battles for them.
Furthermore, in order to join as a third-party to a dispute,
a country must be sufficiently aware of how the dispute affects
its interest. Developing countries do not necessarily have the
legal knowledge to assess how a WTO suit will affect their
interests before the third-party notification requirements. Such
awareness requires legal resources to identify the nature of the
dispute and its effect on the country. As noted previously, it is
presumptuous to expect small developing countries to have the
legal resources and the administrative infrastructure necessary
to identify such complaints within the required time frame.
Lastly, third parties to a dispute cannot make claims of
204
their own. As Palmeter notes, “Third parties cannot make
claims before a panel, and a complainant cannot rely on them
205
to do so on its behalf.” If an issue arises that is not pursued
by the original complainant, a third party would have to
206
initiate separate proceedings against the respondent. The
third party then runs into all the previously discussed issues of
access and incentive in initiating its own dispute. Furthermore,
the WTO does not always accept a third party’s request to join
203. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, in 2008, the total world market production for sorghum was
66,511,675 tons. Id.; see also World Cotton Supply and Distribution, USDA
FOREIGN AGRICULTURE SERVICE, http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdreport.
aspx?hidReportRetrievalName=BVS&hidReportRetrievalID=856&hidReport
RetrievalTemplateID=3 (last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
204. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS , supra note 72, at 110.
205. Id.
206. DSU, supra note 69, at art. 10.4 (“[A] measure already the subject of a
panel proceeding . . . impairs benefits accruing to it under any covered
agreement, that Member may have recourse to normal dispute settlement
procedures under this Understanding”).

OLSON Article

2014]

2/25/2014 10:13 AM

INCENTIVIZING ACCESS TO THE WTO

133

207

a dispute when it does not have a substantial enough interest
in the dispute. In this situation as well, the third party would
have to file separate proceedings. The third party provisions of
the current DSU do not provide adequate protections for
smaller developing countries.
The WTO should therefore allow a successful claimant to
enact retaliatory trade measures based on the amount that
agricultural subsidies suppress prices in the international
market, not only based on how much those subsidies affect the
claimant country. Doing so would provide a significantly
greater incentive to larger countries to alter their trade
policies.
CONCLUSION
The WTO has made significant strides in increasing access
to dispute resolution for developing countries. Its decision in
the EC-Ecuador banana dispute has induced a negotiated
agreement to lower banana import tariffs in the EU. In the
Cotton decision, there is a strong chance that the U.S. will
comply with the panel’s decision and eliminate counter-cyclical
and direct payment subsidies. The dispute settlement system
has provided a significant boon to the creation of equitable
international trade laws.
However, larger developing countries, such as India, China
and Brazil have reaped most of the benefits of this increased
access to the WTO. In order to truly achieve its goal of
incorporating the interests of the least-developed countries, the
WTO must substantially reform its dispute resolution system.
Primarily, the WTO can overrule its previous decision in the
Cotton dispute, which only allows retaliatory measures in the
amount that a country’s domestic subsidies have suppressed
prices in the claimant’s country. The WTO should further allow
a country to assume the place of other prejudiced countries and
retaliate in the amount that the subsidies have suppressed
global prices, not just within the petitioner’s country. Stricter
measures would ensure greater compliance by more powerful
countries and incentivize smaller developing countries to invest
time, resources and finances in challenging prejudicial
subsidies.

207. See, e.g., European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, supra note 79 (denying Ecuador’s status as a
third-party petitioner in the dispute).

